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MORAL AMBIGUITY IN WHITE COLLAR
CRIMINAL LAW
STUART P. GREEN*
Criminal sanctions, the most serious kind of sanctions we
have in a civil society, have traditionally been reserved for con-
duct that not only causes or risks serious harms but is also unam-
biguously wrongful.' In some unusual cases involving necessity
or other justification defenses, a defendant might argue that kill-
ing another human being or causing some other serious harm
was the right thing to do. But in the typical case of core criminal
offenses such as murder, rape, and robbery, there is an underly-
ing assumption that what the defendant did-if in fact she did
do it-was, from a moral perspective, a very bad thing.
There is, however, an important collection of criminal
offenses that reflects a different pattern. The offenses I have in
mind-bribery, extortion, fraud, tax evasion, perjury, obstruction
ofjustice, false statements, insider trading, and various regulatory
and intellectual property crimes-tend to be committed without
violence; the harms they cause are often diffuse; and the victims
they affect are frequently hard to identify. For lack of a better
term, and while recognizing its contested nature, I will refer to
this rather loosely defined "family"2 of offenses as "white collar"
crimes.3
* L.B. Porterie Professor of Law, Louisiana State University. I am grate-
ful to Bill Corbett, David Friedrichs, Rick Garnett, Wayne Logan, and Gerry
Moohr for their insightful comments on an earlier draft.
1. I have discussed the difference between harmfulness and wrongfulness
in Stuart P. Green, Why It's a Crime to Tear the Tag Off a Mattress: Overcriminaliza-
tion and the Moral Content of Regulatory Offenses, 46 EMORY L.J. 1533, 1549-52
(1997) (stating that harmfulness reflects the degree to which an act causes
harm, defined as an intrusion into a person's interests; wrongfulness involves
conduct that violates a moral norm or standard).
2. I have previously discussed the idea of categorizing criminal offenses
according to "family" resemblances, with "fuzzy" boundaries and no single col-
lection of properties that all members (and only those members) share. See
Stuart P. Green, Prototype Theory and the Classification of Offenses in a Revised Model
Penal Code: A General Approach to the Special Part, 4 Bur. CRIM. L. REv. 301,
307-08 (2000).
3. There is, among sociologists, criminologists, law enforcement officials,
the media, social activists, lawyers, law professors, and others, a wide variation in
how the term white collar crime is used. For a useful discussion, see DAvID 0.
FRIEDRICHS, TRUSTED CRIMINALS: WHITE COLLAR CRIME IN CONTEMPORARY SOCI-
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What is interesting and distinctive about this group of
crimes is that, in a surprisingly large number of cases, there is a
genuine doubt as to whether what the defendant was alleged to
have done was in fact morally wrong. In such cases, the issue is
not, as it is with necessity, whether the defendant was confronted
with some extraordinary choice between either obeying the law,
and allowing significant harm to occur; or violating the law, and
preventing such harm.4 Rather, the question is whether the con-
duct engaged in was more or less acceptable behavior, at least in
the realm in which it was performed,5 and therefore, should not
have been subject to criminal sanctions in the first place.
Such ambiguity reflects more than just the effectiveness of
white collar defense counsel in promoting their clients' causes,
although the influence of defense counsel in such cases is surely
significant. In fact, it reflects a more widespread sense-
expressed by judges, jurors, scholars, journalists, and the average
citizen-that there is a kind of moral complexity and uncertainty
in such offenses that is rarely seen in the case of more traditional
crimes. This ambiguity has frequently been remarked upon,6 but
ET 4-12 (2d ed. 2004). I will address the definitional question in an article
that will appear in a forthcoming symposium issue of the Buffalo Criminal Law
Review. For present purposes, it should be clear that I am not using the term
white collar crime to refer to offenses committed exclusively by (1) persons of
high social standing, (2) either corporations or persons acting within a corpo-
rate setting, or (3) persons in the course of their occupations. Rather than
using the term to refer to crimes committed by certain types of offenders, I am
using it to refer to a certain group of offenses, identified in the text. Cf Susan P.
Shapiro, Collaring the Crime, Not the Criminal: Reconsidering the Concept of White-
Collar Crime, 55 AM. Soc. REv. 346, 347 (1990) ("disentangling" the "identifica-
tion of the [white-collar] perpetrators with their misdeeds").
4. Of course, this is not to deny that questions of necessity also do occa-
sionally arise in the context of white collar crime.
5. By qualifying my statement with the phrase "in the realm in which it
was performed," I intend to signal my recognition that morality is in some sense
context-specific. Thus, what passes for acceptable behavior in the business or
litigation context might well not be acceptable in relations between friends,
colleagues, or family members.
6. See, e.g., United States v. Gypsum, 438 U.S. 422, 440-41 (1978) ("[T]he
behavior proscribed by the [Sherman Antitrust] Act is often difficult to distin-
guish from the gray zone of socially acceptable and economicallyjustifiable bus-
iness conduct."); United States v. Sawyer, 85 F.3d 713, 741-42 (1st Cir. 1996)
(stating in a fraud case involving bribery that the line between "unattractive and
actually criminal conduct is blurred"); Sanford H. Kadish, Some Observations on
the Use of Criminal Sanctions in Enforcing Economic Regulations, 30 U. CHI. L. REV.
423, 425 (1963) (noting difficulty of distinguishing some white collar crime
from "acceptable aggressive business behavior"); Geraldine Szott Moohr, An
Enron Lesson: The Modest Role of Criminal Law in Preventing Corporate Crime, 55 FLA.
L. REV. 937, 959 ("Compared to other forms of criminal activity, white collar
crime is famously written in shades of gray."); Marilyn E. Walsh & Donna D.
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there have been few systematic attempts to explain exactly how
or why it occurs. 7 This essay offers a preliminary attempt at
doing so. Part A offers several specific examples-essentially,
torn from the day's headlines-of what I mean by "moral ambi-
guity" in white collar crime. Part B posits ten overlapping and
interrelated factors that help explain both the causes and effects
of such ambiguity.
I. EXAMPLES OF MORAL AMBIGUITY
The kind of moral ambiguity I have in mind is illustrated by
the following five cases:
* In November 2003, Clarence Norman, chairman of the
Brooklyn Democratic Party, and Jeffrey Feldman, the
Party's Executive Director, were indicted on what
amounted to charges of extortion.8 There is little dis-
pute that Norman and Feldman had met with candidates
running for civil court judge and told them that they
would not receive the party's wholehearted support
unless they used certain selected vendors and consul-
tants. 9 But there is serious disagreement about the crim-
inality of such conduct. According to Brooklyn District
Attorney Charles Hynes, such conduct constitutes the
very "definition [of] extortion."10 According to lawyers
for Norman and Feldman, as well as various prominent
political figures in Brooklyn, however, there was nothing
illegal about what the defendants did. As Norman's law-
yer, Roger Bennet Adler put it,
If you take [the allegations] at face value ... impos-
ing certain conditions on candidates running on a
joint slate, there was nothing unreasonable about
those conditions. Suggesting that if you don't basi-
Schram, The Victim of White-Collar Crime: Accuser or Accused?, in WHITE-COLLAR
CRIME: THEORY AND RESEARCH 32, 36 (Gilbert Geis & Ezra Stotland eds., 1980)
("[Miany frauds and larcenies by trick or false pretenses can be viewed as
excesses in what is normally accepted, aggressive salesmanship or shrewd eco-
nomic behavior.").
7. Two such attempts, which have clearly influenced my own, are HAZEL
CROALL, WHITE COLLAR CRIME: CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND CRIMINOLOGY 12-16
(1992), and David Nelken, White-Collar Crime, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
CRIMINOLOGY 355 (Mike Maguire et al. eds., 1994) (attempting to thoroughly
address the ambiguous nature of white collar crime).
8. Andy Newman, Case Turns on Whether Usual Politics is a Felony, N.Y.
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cally agree to these expenditures we're not going to
be as effective for you on primary day, I think, is a
statement of the obvious. It's not extortion.1 1
In June 2002, the Arthur Andersen accounting firm was
convicted of obstructing the Securities and Exchange
Commission's investigation into the collapse of Enron.
12
Among the pieces of evidence that jurors found most
incriminating was an email from in-house Andersen law-
yer, Nancy Temple, instructing Andersen partner, David
Duncan, to remove language from an internal Andersen
memo suggesting that Andersen had concluded that an
earlier Enron final disclosure had been misleading.
13
The email also advised Duncan to remove any reference
to consultations with Andersen's in-house legal team,
saying it could be considered a waiver of attorney-client
privilege. According to one of the jurors, "[w]e wanted
to find Andersen not guilty and find that they stood up
to Enron. But it's clear [that Temple] knew investigators
were coming and was telling [Andersen] to alter the evi-
dence."14 Yet not everyone agreed with the jury's inter-
pretation. Several days after the Andersen trial ended,
Stephen Gillers, a leading professor of legal ethics,
opined on the op-ed page of the New York Times that the
advice Temple had given to the accounting firm was not
a crime at all, but rather "the kind of advice lawyers give
clients all the time.'
15
* In 2001, computer programmer Dmitry Sklyarov and his
firm, ElcomSoft, became the first defendants charged
with violating criminal provisions of the 1998 Digital Mil-
lennium Copyright Act (DMCA),16 which are intended
to prevent the circumvention of technological protec-
tions on copyrighted material.17 Sklyarov had cracked
the technological protection measure used by Adobe Sys-
11. Id.
12. Kurt Eichenwald, Andersen Guilty in Effort to Block Inquiry on Enron, N.Y.
TIMES, June 16, 2002, at Al.
13. Tom Fowler, Lauyers Fear Legal Impact ofAndersen, Hous. CHRON.,June
25, 2002, at 1.
14. Id.
15. Stephen Gillers, The Flaw in the Andersen Verdict, N.Y. TIMES, June 18,
2002, at A23.
16. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860
(1998).
17. Lisa M. Bowman, ElcomSofi Verdict: Not Guilty, CNET NEWS.COM, Dec.
17, 2002, at http://news.com.com/2100-1023-978176.html (last visited Jan. 31,
2004) (on file with the Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy).
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tems to control access to copyrighted content distributed
in its eBook format. The prosecution of Sklyarov was
widely criticized by civil liberties groups such as the Elec-
tronic Frontier Foundation, who maintained that the
DMCA violates First Amendment rights and hinders
technological innovation. Sklyarov was successful in hav-
ing the charges against him dropped in return for his
agreeing to testify against ElcomSoft. The case against
ElcomSoft proceeded to trial, where the firm was acquit-
ted. The jury believed that ElcomSoft's product did vio-
late the law, but apparently nullified the verdict based on
its belief that ElcomSoft and Sklyarov had done nothing
morally wrong.'
8
" Between 1995 and 1999, executives at two of the largest
seed companies in the world, Monsanto and Pioneer Hi-
Bred International, met repeatedly and agreed to charge
higher prices for genetically modified seeds. 19 The talks
between the two companies involved licenses that
allowed Pioneer to sell altered seeds developed by Mon-
santo. To the extent that the companies discussed
prices, swapped profit projections, and talked about
cooperating to keep the prices of genetically modified
seeds high, one might think that they violated the crimi-
nal price-fixing provisions of the Sherman Antitrust Act.
Yet, according to a spokesman for Monsanto, "[i]n the
context of a potentially new license for technology, it is
absolutely within the law to discuss the price and the
means of compensation to the licensing party."
20
" In October 2003, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, the chief exec-
utive and principal owner of Russia's largest oil com-
pany, Yukos, was arrested and charged with tax evasion
and related offenses. 2 1 A few days later, Leon Aron,
director of Russian studies at the American Enterprise
Institute, published an op-ed piece in the New York Times
arguing that, while Khodorkovsky may have "broke[n]
some laws .... in the chaotic Russian economy of the
[1990s], when the state was privatizing its assets on a
grand scale, no large business was 'clean'-and the
larger the company, the greater the chance it committed
18. See id.
19. David Barboza, Questions Linger on Price of Seeds, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6,
2004, at Al.
20. Id.
21. Erin E. Arvedlund & Neela Banerjee, Arrest of Oil Chief Could Roil Rus-
sian Stock Market, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 2003, at Cl.
2004]
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violations."2 2 According to Aron, given the tax scheme
then in force in Russia, "lt]ax evasion was the only strat-
egy that allowed an entrepreneur to pay salaries and
invest in his business."23
II. TEN FACTORS ASSOCIATED WITH MoRAL AMBIGUITY
In what sense do the foregoing cases involve moral ambigu-
ity? Are there different forms of ambiguity that they reflect?
What causes such ambiguity? What are its effects? Does the
ambiguity reflect the way in which we regard the people who
engage in such acts, or the way we perceive the acts themselves?
Does such ambiguity pose a problem for the criminal law? Can
the problem be fixed? Each of the five cases identified above is
complex, and generalizations are bound to be difficult. They
involve a wide range of quite different statutes, perpetrators, vic-
tims, harms, and mitigating and aggravating circumstances. It
will not be possible to offer anything like a comprehensive assess-
ment here. Instead, I want to identify ten overlapping and mutu-
ally reinforcing factors that are, in an admittedly imprecise way,
characteristic of white collar crime more generally.
A. Cases in Which It Is Difficult To Distinguish Between Criminality
and "Merely Aggressive" Behavior
Everyone, or almost everyone, would agree that certain core
cases of bribery, fraud, tax evasion, obstruction of justice, per-
jury, and extortion involve conduct that is morally wrongful; and
that if such conduct is proven, it should be treated as criminal.
For example, if the Brooklyn Democratic Party bosses referred to
above had threatened to bankrupt anyone who failed to use their
favored vendors, there would be little doubt that they would have
committed a serious crime and would deserve to be punished.
The problem is that much white collar crime is not nearly so
straightforward. Many instances of alleged extortion, fraud, and
similar offenses are difficult to distinguish from conduct that
involves "merely aggressive" business, litigation, or political
behavior. In such cases, it may seem that: what is alleged to be
extortion was nothing more than "hardball negotiating"; what
prosecutors call obstruction of justice was actually just "zealous
advocacy"; what an indictment refers to as perjury was really just
"wiliness" on the witness stand; what is alleged to be fraud was
22. Leon Aron, Crime and Punishment For Capitalists, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30,
2003, at A29.
23. Id.
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merely "creative accounting"; what a criminal complaint calls tax
evasion was in fact legal tax "avoidance"; what prosecutors con-
sider a bribe was merely a "campaign contribution," and so on.
Conventional street crime rarely exhibits such ambiguities. In a
forthcoming book, I will offer a detailed discussion of the diffi-
culties involved in drawing lines between criminal and non-crimi-
nal behavior of this sort. For the moment, I will merely note
that, in such cases, it is often subtle differences in the facts, and
in the interpretation of those facts, that determine the moral
judgments we make about a defendant's conduct and whether
such a defendant should ultimately be convicted.
B. Overcriminalization and the Problem of "Sticky" Norms
In contrast to offenses such as fraud, perjury, and extortion,
there is a group of offenses involving conduct that-even in the
most hard-core cases-is not universally viewed as morally wrong-
ful. For example, there is significant debate over whether it
should be a crime to engage in: (1) insider trading;24 (2) various
so-called malum prohibitum regulatory offenses, such as taking
sleeping pills without a prescription, carrying a gun without a
permit, and selling liquor without a license;25 and (3) various
intellectual property offenses, such as criminal copyright and
trademark infringement, theft of trade secrets, and the manufac-
ture and sale of devices that can be used to circumvent techno-
logical protection measures (the last of which being the offense
with which Dmitry Sklyarov was charged) .26 All of these are areas
in which "overcriminalization" has been said to occur.
The problem is particularly striking in the intellectual prop-
erty area. Recent studies have shown that more than 70% of peo-
ple polled do not believe it is wrong to make unauthorized
photocopies of a book or magazine, more than half do not
regard the unauthorized downloading of music as immoral, 49%
do not think it is wrong to make unauthorized copies of CDs and
tapes, 35% do not believe it is wrong to make unauthorized cop-
ies of videocassettes, and 25% do not believe it is wrong to make
unauthorized copies of computer software.27
24. See Stuart P. Green, Cheating, 23 LAW & PHIL. 137, 176-78 (2004).
25. See Green, supra note 1, at 1549-52.
26. See generally Stuart P. Green, Plagiarism, Norms, and the Limits of Theft
Law: Some Observations on the Use of Criminal Sanctions in Enforcing Intellectual Prop-
erty Rights, 54 HASTINGS LJ. 167 (2002).
27. See id. at 236-37 (citing studies); Geraldine Szott Moohr, The Crime of
Copyright Infringement: An Inquiry Based on Morality, Harm, and Criminal Theory, 83
B.U. L. REv. 731, 767-68 (2003) (citing studies). There is, of course, an inter-
2004]
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In what sense, then, are offenses like these morally ambigu-
ous? By labeling and punishing certain conduct as "criminal,"
our legal system sends a message that such conduct is worthy of
censure.28 When such labeling is consistent with what society as
a whole regards as morally wrongful, law and norms are mutually
reinforcing. But when there is a gap between what the law
regards as morally wrongful and what a significant segment of
society views as such-that is, where norms become "sticky,"'29-
moral conflict and ambiguity are likely to be the result.
C. Complexity of Underlying Activity and Difficulty of Defining
Harms and Identiing Victims
Most of the white collar offenses we are concerned with here
can be distinguished from traditional street crimes in that they
tend to involve more complex forms of underlying activity,
harder-to-discern harms, and harder-to-identify victims. Like the
alleged price fixing between Monsanto and Pioneer, white collar
offenses often occur over an extended period of time and involve
elaborate activities such as those associated with manufacturing
and industrial processes, marketing, corporate finance, the stock
market, so-called document retention procedures, government
contracts, financial auditing, trial and litigation procedures, and
political fundraising. Such activity frequently occurs within large
and complex organizations, involving numerous individuals
occupying a wide range of different positions, and many series of
complicated transactions. Understanding how such processes
work can require a fairly sophisticated understanding of disci-
plines such as finance, economics, engineering, medicine, politi-
cal science, organizational theory, management, accounting,
environmental science, and information technology. It is often
hard enough for the lay public to understand how these
processes are supposed to work when they are conducted in a
legal manner; it is all the more difficult to understand how they
function when they involve criminal activity. Because the context
in which white collar crime occurs is often so complex, it can be
difficult to understand exactly how a defendant has violated a
given criminal provision.
esting question as to why views of wrongfulness differ so substantially depending
on which medium is being copied.
28. The locus classicus for this kind of argument is JOEL FEINBERG, The
Expressive Function of Criminal Punishment, in DOING & DESERVING: ESSAYS IN THE
THEORY OF RESPONSIBILITY 95 (1970).
29. See Dan M. Kahan, Gentle Nudges vs. Hard Shoves: Solving the Sticky
Norms Problem, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 607, 607 (2000) (referring to the problem of
prevailing social norms that have not yet caught up to legislation).
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White collar offenses also tend to involve harms that are
more difficult to identify than in the case of conventional street
crimes. For example, there is not likely to be much controversy
about the proposition that the principal harm caused by homi-
cide is the death of a human being. In the case of crimes such as
tax evasion, bribery, and insider trading, by contrast, the identifi-
cation of harm and victim presents real difficulties. Some direct
harms seem relatively straightforward; presumably, tax evasion
leads to reduced revenues for the public treasury, bribery to
biased governmental decision making, and insider trading to loss
of money for some investors. But there are also significant indi-
rect, diffuse, and aggregative harms caused by such conduct,
which are much harder to quantify-e.g., loss of investor and
consumer confidence, distrust of government, and bad decisions
made by public officials.
Given the diffuseness of harms associated with white collar
offenses, it is not surprising that identification of affected victims
is also harder than in the case of conventional offenses."0 For
example, while we have no problem in saying that the principal
victim of homicide is the decedent,"1 it is difficult to say exactly
which citizens are victimized by environmental violations and
government corruption; which taxpayers are victimized by false
claims and tax evasion; which employees are victimized by labor
law violations and the devastation of their retirement accounts;
and which consumers are victimized by price fixing, violations of
the food and drug and product safety laws, and fraudulent mar-
keting practices. Many white collar crimes involve small harms to
a large number of victims, and are significant only in the aggre-
gate. 2 And, of course, some victims of white collar crime are
never even aware that they have been victimized.
30. See generally MICHAEL LEVI & ANDREW PITHOUSE, VICTIMS OF WHITE
COLLAR CRIME: THE SOCIAL AND MEDIA CONSTRUCTION OF BUSINESS FRAUD
(forthcoming 2005).
31. This is not to say that there are not difficult and interesting questions
about the extent to which, say, the family and friends of the principal victim
should also be regarded, and perhaps eligible for compensation, as "victims."
See generally MARKUS DiRK DUBBER, VICTIMS IN THE WAR ON CRIME: THE USE AND
ABUSE OF VICTIMS' RIGHTS 245-333 (New York University Press 2002) (analyzing
crime from the perspectives of the victim and the offender). My point is simply
that the task of determining who is the principal victim of violent crime is gen-
erally easier than that of determining who is a victim of white collar crime. For
more on this point, see Stuart P. Green, Victim's Rights and the Limits of Criminal
Law, CRIM. L. FORUM (forthcoming 2004) (reviewing DUBBER, supra).
32. SeeJOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS 187-217 (1984) (assessing and
comparing harms).
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All of this complexity of underlying conduct and difficulty in
identifying harms and victims contributes inevitably to moral
ambiguity. If people find it hard to recognize what kinds of
harms a particular offense causes, or who suffers them, they are
likely to be less certain that such conduct is wrong and should be
subject to sanctions.
D. Diffusion of Responsibility
Not only does white collar crime present difficulties in
assessing the means by which it is committed, the harms it causes,
and the victims it affects, but there are also problems in deter-
mining exactly who (or what, in the case of an entity) should be
held responsible. Many of the offenses referred to above are
most likely to occur within the context of complex institutions,
such as large corporations, partnerships, and government agen-
cies. In such organizations, responsibility for decision making
and implementation is shared among boards of directors, share-
holders, top and mid-level managers, and ground-level employ-
ees." As a result, the blame we attribute to an individual actor
within the organization in which he works may be less than the
blame we attribute to an individual actor committing an equally
serious street crime on his own.
Consider again the case of Arthur Andersen.34 Prior to its
demise, Andersen was one of the "big five" international account-
ing firms, with more than 25,000 employees in the United States
alone, and thousands more employees working at affiliated
offices around the world. According to the indictment charging
Andersen with obstruction of justice, documents were allegedly
destroyed not only in Houston, but also in London, Chicago, and
Portland, Oregon. The order to destroy the documents came
from within a complex corporate hierarchy and was carried out
by hundreds of employees. A low-level secretary or clerk who
shredded documents knowing that they would be subject to an
SEC subpoena would surely deserve blame for his conduct. But
our judgment of such a person would likely be tempered-made
more ambivalent, I would say-by the fact that the person acted
33. See generally BEYOND THE LAw: CRIME IN COMPLEX ORGANIZATIONS
(Michael Tonry & AlbertJ. Reiss, Jr. eds., 1993) (focusing on organizations as
criminal law violators).
34. See generally Stephan Landsman, Death of an Accountant: The Juy Con-
victs Arthur Andersen of Obstruction of Justice, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1203 (2003)
(providing a helpful analysis of the Arthur Andersen case).
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within the context of a large organization and shared responsibil-
ity with numerous other actors.35
E. Conflation of Liability for Inchoate and Completed Offenses
The criminal law has traditionally distinguished between
inchoate and completed forms of criminality. Inchoate offenses,
such as attempt, conspiracy, and solicitation, are generally not
punished as severely as completed offenses (although there is a
lively scholarly debate about whether this should be so
3 6 ). White
collar crime, by contrast, tends to merge complete and incom-
plete conduct into a single offense, punishable by a single pen-
alty. And it often criminalizes conduct that involves nothing
more than the creation of a risk of harm.
37
Extortion, such as that which was allegedly committed by top
officials of the Brooklyn Democratic Party, provides a good
example. Extortion is defined as the "obtaining of property from
another, with his consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or
threatened force, violence, or fear, or under color of official
right."3 In order to be convicted under the federal Hobbs Act,
however, one need not actually obtain any property from
another.39 It is enough that one simply attempt to obtain property
in this manner. In other words, federal law merges completed
and inchoate extortion into a single, undifferentiated offense,
and imposes the same penalty on both.
A similar phenomenon can be observed in the context of
other significant white collar offenses as well: bribery is bribery
regardless of whether any bribe is actually accepted; fraud is
fraud regardless of whether anyone's property is actually taken;
35. Indeed, it was the diffuseness of responsibility that presumably led
prosecutors to name Andersen itself, rather than its individual employees, as
the defendant in its indictment for obstruction of justice. My point here is not
to engage in the surprisingly still persistent debate over whether corporations
and other entities should be subject to criminal liability. For a useful summary,
see Wayne A. Logan, Criminal Law Sanctuaries, 38 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rv. 321,
348-64 (2003). See also Stuart P. Green, The Criminal Prosecution of Local Govern-
ments, 72 N.C. L. REV. 1197 (1994). My point is simply that our judgments of
individuals who commit criminal offenses while working in a corporate or orga-
nizational setting are likely to be different from our judgments of people who
commit equally serious offenses in a non-organizational setting.
36. See generally R.A. Durr, CRIMINa ALTrEMPTs 116-27 (1996) (analyzing
the punishment of criminal attempts).
37. See generally R.A. Duff, Criminalizing Endangerment, in DEFINING CRIMES:
EssAys ON THE CRIMINAL Lw's "SPEcIAL PART" (R.A. Duff & Stuart P. Green
eds., forthcoming 2005).
38. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1951 (b) (2) (West 2000).
39. Id. at § 1951 (a).
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perjury is perjury regardless of whether a lying witness is
believed; and obstruction of justice is obstruction regardless of
whether any proceedings are actually hindered.4" The result is
that what is prosecuted as "extortion," "bribery," "fraud," "per-
jury," or "obstruction" is often, in reality, attempted extortion,
bribery, fraud, perjury, or obstruction. By repeatedly using the
label of a completed offense to refer to what is actually an
attempt, the system dilutes the seriousness with which certain
white collar offenses are perceived, and thereby fosters moral
ambiguity.
F. Distinctive Role for Mens Rea
Mens rea, or "guilty mind," reflects one of the defining char-
acteristics of criminal law. Many serious harms caused without
mental intent provide grounds for civil liability, but they do not
traditionally give rise to criminal prosecution. The criminal law
has traditionally required not only that the defendant cause a
serious harm (the actus reus) but also that she do so with a par-
ticular state of mind-criminal intent, purpose, knowledge,
belief, recklessness, or the like. People who cause harm without
such mental element ordinarily cannot be said to be "at fault" or
"deserving" in the way that the just imposition of punishment is
thought to require.41
In the case of many white collar crimes, however, the
requirement of mens rea is stood on its head. Some of the
offenses-particularly in the area of regulatory crime-require
either no mens rea at all (i.e., they are strict liability offenses), or
they require a low level form of mens rea, such as negligence.
And because of such dilution of the mens rea requirement, it is
difficult to say that the perpetrators of such offenses are morally
culpable, or at least culpable to the extent that would justify the
imposition of criminal penalties.
Other white collar offenses present a converse problem:
proof of mens rea is so crucial to their definition that conduct
performed without it not only fails to expose the actor to crimi-
nal (as opposed to civil) liability, but is not regarded as wrongful
at all. Consider, for example, the case of bribery. Imagine that
X, a constituent of Congressman Y, gives Y a certain amount of
money (which, we can further assume, falls within the amounts
permissible under campaign finance laws). Assuming that X acts
40. See Stuart P. Green, What's Wrong with Bribery?, in DEFINING CRIMES:
ESSAYS ON THE CRIMINAL LAW'S "SPECIAL PART", supra note 37.
41. See Stuart P. Green, Six Senses of Strict Liability: A Plea for Formalism, in
ASSESSING STRIcr LIABILITY (A.P. Simester ed., forthcoming).
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with the expectation of receiving nothing in return, he has com-
mitted no offense; he has merely made a legal campaign contri-
bution. X's act of giving money to Y would constitute a bribe if
and only if X "corruptly . .. inten [ded] to influence" an official
act.42 The problem, however, is that it is notoriously difficult to
determine whether an actor acted with corrupt intent. In light of
such difficulties, it is not surprising that such conduct is often
viewed as morally ambiguous.
G. Value of Surrounding Legitimate Conduct
Most of the offenses I have been considering are committed
in the course of conduct that is otherwise legal, and even socially
productive. Government officials who accept bribes are fre-
quently also involved in legitimate governmental functions; inves-
tors who trade on the basis of inside information tend to be
engaged in legal investment as well; and people who commit reg-
ulatory and intellectual property crimes are often engaged in the
business of producing valuable products and services. Mikhail
Khodorkovsky, for example, is not only one of the richest men in
Russia and head of its largest oil company, but also an important
symbol of Russia's transition to a capitalist economy, and a hero
to many. In some cases, such people even use their wealth for
worthwhile philanthropic purposes.43 The same cannot gener-
ally be said in the case of drug dealers, burglars, and serial killers
(although there are surely exceptions). To the extent that a per-
petrator's criminal conduct is likely to be judged in light of, and
balanced against, her socially beneficial conduct, ambiguity is
once again likely to be the result.
42. 18 U.S.C.A. § 201(b) (1) (A) (West 2000).
43. Among the central figures in recent white collar crime scandals who
also have a distinguished record of philanthropy are Kenneth Lay, former CEO
of Enron, and Bernie Ebbers, former CEO of WorldCom. See Heather
Bourbeau, The Redemption of Swine: Can Ken Lay Make a Comeback , SLATE, Sept.
19, 2002, at http://slate.msn.com/id/
20 7 12 0 3 ("Lay donated over $2.5 million
to more than 250 organizations through his family's foundation, and he had
Enron give 1 percent of profits to mostly Houston-based charities.... Ebbers
raised record sums of money for Mississippi College, arranged scholarships for
local children, aided local businesses, gave to churches, [and] helped neigh-
bors become millionaires through WorldCom stock. . . . "). Richard Scrushy,
founder and former CEO of HealthSouth, is also a benefactor of many worth-
while charities in his native Alabama and elsewhere. See A Biographical Sketch:
Richard Scrushy and HealthSouth, RichardMScrushy.com, at http://
www.richardmscrushy.com/biography.aspx (last visited on Jan. 31, 2004) (on
file with the Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy).
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H. Legislative Attitudes
Our judgment of whether and to what extent various forms
of conduct are morally wrong is undoubtedly influenced by how
such conduct is treated by the law." Indeed, there are, in addi-
tion to the criminalization of ostensibly morally neutral conduct
referred to above, at least four other ways in which legislatures
have contributed to the phenomenon of moral ambiguity in
white collar crime. First, many of the crimes we have been con-
sidering are dealt with in specialized, regulatory portions of state
and federal law rather than in the criminal law proper. For
example, securities fraud is dealt with in the part of the U.S.
Code dealing with securities law, tax evasion in sections dealing
with tax law, criminal price-fixing in the antitrust provisions, and
environmental crimes in the tides dealing with environmental
law. Because such offenses are codified separately from "real
crimes," they are perhaps less likely to be thought of as real
crimes.
Second, most of the offenses we have been talking about are
enforceable by means of both criminal prosecution and private
or governmental civil actions. Indeed, it has been suggested that,
in the case of certain forms of white collar wrongdoing, criminal
law may even be the less preferred approach.4 5 Such "hybrid"
criminal/civil character is particularly evident under regulatory-
type statutes such as the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the
Sherman Act, Clean Water Act, Bankruptcy Code, Tax Code,
Truth in Lending Act, False Claims Act, and Federal Food, Drug
and Cosmetic Act.4 6 Under such statutes, precisely the same con-
duct can give rise to either criminal or civil penalties, with the
discretion to pursue one or the other wholly in the hands of pros-
ecuting officials. The result is that the line between white collar
crime and non-criminal cases becomes blurred, even arbitrary.
Third, under federal law, some criminal statutes contain a"morally neutral" element that must be satisfied in order for fed-
44. See Tom R. Tyler & John M. Darley, Building a Law-Abiding Society; Tak-
ing Public Views About Morality and the Legitimacy of Legal Authorities into Account
When Formulating Substantive Law, 28 HOFSTRA L. REv. 707, 712-13 (2000).
45. Darryl K. Brown, Street Crime, Corporate Crime, and the Contingency of
Criminal Liability, 149 U. PA. L. REv. 1295, 1298 (2001).
46. See Margaret V. Sachs, Harmonizing Civil and Criminal Enforcement of
Federal Regulatoy Statutes: The Case of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 2001 U.
ILL. L. REv. 1025, 1027. See also Andrew Ashworth, Is the Criminal Law a Lost
Cause?, 116 L.Q. REv. 225, 234-35 (2000) (discussing the blurring of civil and
criminal categories in intellectual property and competition law); see generally
Lawrence M. Solan, Statutory Inflation and Institutional Choice, 44 WM. & MARY L.
REv. 2209 (2003).
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eral jurisdiction to be established. For example, under the mail
fraud statute, the government must prove that the defendant
"place[d] in any post office or authorized depository for mail
matter, any matter or thing whatever to be sent or delivered by
the Postal Service."47 Because the government must present evi-
dence that the defendant engaged in the morally neutral act of
mailing a letter, some observers may be left with the impression
that the larger mail fraud prosecution itself involves a morally
ambiguous act.
48
Fourth, a reasonable case could be made that legislatures
have tended to authorize (and judges to impose) less severe pen-
alties for white collar offenses than for equally or less serious
street crimes.49 Admittedly, comparing white collar and non-
white collar crimes in terms of seriousness is bound to be diffi-
cult. Nevertheless, one cannot help but be struck by U.S. Sen-
tencing Commission statistics indicating that, during 2001, the
average sentence for white collar crime was just over 20 months,
while the average sentence for drug and violent crimes was 71.7
and 89.5 months, respectively.5" And there is plenty of anecdotal
evidence to the same effect; to cite just one example, in the late
1990s, officials of Archer Daniels Midland were caught red-
handed on videotape rigging prices of agricultural products with
competitors. The trial judge sentenced the two ringleaders to a
mere two years in prison each. An outraged appeals court
increased the sentence to the statutory maximum of three years.
Even so, as Kurt Eichenwald has put it, the result was that "execu-
tives who effectively cheated every grocery store in the country
received shorter sentences than if they had robbed just one."51
J. Prosecutorial and Judicial Attitudes
Moral ambiguity in white collar crime is fostered not only by
legislative bodies, but also by judges and prosecutors. In the case
of judges, one can observe an interesting inversion in attitudes,
apparently based on political ideology and class consciousness:
"conservative" judges tend to be more aggressive than their "lib-
47. 18 U.S.C. § 1341.
48. Thanks to Rick Garnett for bringing this point to my attention.
49. See, e.g., Ilene Nagel & John Hagan, The Sentencing of White-Collar
Criminals in Federal Courts: A Sociological Exploration of Disparity, 80 MICH. L. REv.
1427 (1982).
50. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 2001 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING
STATIsTIcs 32 fig. E (2001) (defining white collar crime to include embezzle-
ment, forgery/counterfeiting, bribery, money laundering, and tax evasion).
51. Kurt Eichenwald, White-Collar Defense Stance: The Criminal-less Crime,
N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 3, 2002, at DI.
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eral" counterparts in their attitudes toward the investigation,
prosecution, and punishment of street crime; in the case of white
collar offenses, just the opposite is true.52 To the extent that
people take their cues from judicial decisions, the result is likely
to be a certain amount of confusion.
There is also evidence to suggest that prosecutors are likely
to be more lenient with respect to white collar crime than in the
case of street crime. A striking example is provided by a recent
study of the federal Occupational Safety and Health Administra-
tion (OSHA). 53  During the period from 1982 to 2002, the
agency investigated 1,242 cases in which it concluded that work-
ers had died because of "willful" safety violations on part of their
employers. All of these cases would seem to have involved a vio-
lation of criminal law. Yet in ninety-three percent of the cases,
OSHA declined to prosecute, apparently owing to a "culture of
reluctance [that] rules [the agency] regardless of which party
controls Congress or the White House. 54
Just as the public takes its cues from the legislative treatment
of white collar crime, so too is it influenced by how such crime is
treated by prosecutors and in the courts. If white collar crime is
treated as less serious than street crime, it is not surprising that
people tend to think of it as less serious than such crime.
K. The Criminal Defense Bar, Publicists, the Media, and
the Academy
Public attitudes towards white collar crime are affected not
only by how such offenses are treated by government officials,
but also by the criminal defense bar, the media, the public rela-
tions industry, and the academy. Defendants in white collar
criminal cases are much more likely than those in street crime
cases to have the money to hire lawyers, investigators, paralegals,
jury consultants, and others to assist in their cause. Highly paid
white collar criminal defense lawyers are more successful at
almost every stage in the criminal justice process than their pub-
lic defender counterparts. They do a better job of persuading
52. See, e.g., J. Kelly Strader, The Judicial Politics of White Collar Crime, 50
HASTINGS L.J. 1199, 1202 (1999) (stating "in a substantial number of the
[Supreme] Court's leading white collar criminal cases [during the years
1972-96], ranging from securities fraud to political corruption cases, the 'lib-
eral'justices [such as Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens] have voted to affirm con-
victions, and the 'conservative'justices [such as Scalia, Rehnquist, and Thomas]
to reverse them.").
53. See David Barstow, U.S. Rarely Seeks Charges for Deaths in Workplace, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 22, 2003, at Al.
54. Id.
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prosecutors not to indict, preventing the prosecution from
obtaining evidence needed to convict, keeping witnesses from
talking to prosecutors, presenting their case in the media,
obtaining favorable plea bargains, pursuing post-conviction
appeals, and arguing mitigation in sentencing.55 Some white col-
lar defendants even hire publicists and launch websites intended
to help repair reputations damaged by allegations of criminal
conduct. 56 All of those retained are expert at exploiting the
moral ambiguity of white collar crime, whether at trial or in the
larger court of public opinion. The seriousness of white collar
crime also tends to be minimized by the media. Both newspa-
pers and broadcast media tend to give more attention to conven-
tional, interpersonal, sensational, and violent forms of
criminality than to their more subtle white collar counterparts.
57
The more limited media coverage of such crimes seems to be
attributable to the complexity and supposed "dullness" of the
conduct involved, the more indirect nature of the harm exper-
ienced by individual victims, and the fact that such criminality
tends to produce fewer striking visual images on which television
news in particular thrives.58 In addition, it may be that media
organizations are more likely to be intimidated in their coverage
of white collar crime by the possibility that corporate sponsors
might withdraw advertising and that deep-pocketed targets of
white collar investigations might institute defamation suits.
59
Finally, it is worth noting that the academic treatment of
white collar crime may also contribute to its morally ambiguous
character. Criminologists going back to Edwin Sutherland have
complained that their colleagues neglect white collar criminality
in favor of street crime. A similar phenomenon can be observed
in the law schools. White collar offenses are almost never dealt
55. See generally KENNETH MANN, DEFENDING WHrrE-COLLAR CRIME (1985)
(discussing white collar criminal defense practice).
56. See Constance L. Hays & Leslie Eaton, Martha Stewart, Near Trial,
Arranges Her Image, N.Y. TiMES, Jan. 20, 2004, at Al (discussing multi-million
dollar campaign used by Stewart in advance of her trial for obstruction of jus-
tice, false statements, securities fraud, and conspiracy, involving polling, jury
focus groups, television interviews, and a web site); Martha Stewart, An Open
Letter from Martha Stewart, MarthaTalks.com, at http://www.marthatalks.com
(last visited Jan. 31, 2004) (on file with the Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics
& Public Policy); see also Latest Headlines, RichardMScrushy.com, at http://
www.richardmscrushy.com (last visited Jan. 31, 2004) (on file with the Notre
Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy).
57. For a useful discussion of how the media deal with white collar crime,
see FRIEDRICHS, supra note 3, at 17-19.
58. Id. at 18-19.
59. Id.
20041
518 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 18
with in introductory courses in criminal law, and are only rarely
mentioned in the general literature on criminal law theory.
There are of course courses in "white collar" and "federal" crime
that deal with offenses such as mail fraud, perjury, and obstruc-
tion. But to the extent that law school curricula deal at all with
the subject of regulatory crime, it is only in passing, in more gen-
eral courses on environmental, tax, securities, antitrust, intellec-
tual property, labor, and administrative law. The result is that
such offenses (if not white collar crime more generally) tend to
be viewed more as "violations" than as genuine "crimes."
CONCLUSION
Assuming that white collar crime really does reflect the kind
of moral ambiguity I have been describing, two questions natu-
rally arise: First, is moral ambiguity a bad thing? Second, assum-
ing that it is, what can be done about it? Although ambiguity
might in some cases mean flexibility, it is surely not a phenome-
non that, as a general matter, should be encouraged. Our system
is committed to the notion that only the most clearly harmful
and wrongful kinds of conduct should be treated with criminal
sanctions. Such sanctions need to be applied sparingly, consist-
ently, and with a clearly articulated rationale. If our attitudes
towards white collar crime are too ambiguous, the moral author-
ity of the criminal law will itself be viewed as ambiguous.
How, then, can such ambiguity be reduced? A number of
reforms could certainly be considered: We could insist that legis-
latures avoid criminalizing conduct the moral wrongfulness of
which is the subject of serious controversy. We could require leg-
islatures to distinguish clearly between inchoate and completed
conduct, and insist on a showing of mens rea for all crimes. We
could endeavor to define the harms caused by, and the victims
of, white collar crime more clearly than is done under current
law. We could seek ways to integrate white collar crime more
fully into our criminal codes, create sentencing parity between
comparable white collar and conventional offenses, and require
greater evenhandedness in terms of prosecutorial and judicial
attitudes. We could demand that conduct resulting in criminal
liability be distinguished more clearly from 'conduct resulting in
civil liability. And we could formulate rules to determine more
clearly how criminal responsibility should be attributed to indi-
viduals working within large organizations.
But even if all of these reforms could be effected, there
would, I believe, remain an unavoidable element of moral ambi-
guity deeply embedded in the fabric of white collar criminal law.
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Much of white collar crime involves conduct that is hard to
define, hard to identify, and hard to prove; yet it is also some of
the most harmful conduct our society faces. The answer is not a
retreat from the criminalization of such conduct, but rather a
recognition of its distinctive character, and a resolve to seek out
certainty where ambiguity now prevails.

